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$1,750 for a total deduction of $6,750 for 2000.  The rest of
the OID would be deductible in 2001 in the amount of
$8,750.
Thus, the total of interest for the two years ($15,500) would
be deductible to the extent of $6,750 in 2000 and $8,750 in
2001.  Whether that is an advantage (compared to obtaining
the full deduction in 2001 when actually paid) depends upon
the value to the taxpayer of the $6,750 deduction in 2000.  If
the deduction results in a larger net operating loss (and,
possibly a tax refund) or a smaller 2000 tax bill, the outcome
could be advantageous.
How are payments applied?
An important issue is how payments are allocated, for
federal income tax purposes, between principal and interest.
The OID rules require that payments first be allocated to
OID, to the extent of the OID that has accrued as of the date
the payment is due, and then to payment of principal.10 Thus,
paying down on principal and leaving the interest amount to
be rolled does not avoid the OID characterization.
In conclusion
Negotiations with a lender over a line of credit rarely leave
room for a discussion of the finer points of income tax
treatment of the interest.  However, it may be in the best
interest of the borrower to plan carefully the rollover of
unpaid balances with an eye to interest deductibility.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law § 28.05[3][b]
(1999); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 4.03[12][a][i]
(1999).
2 I.R.C. § 1273(a)(2).
3 I.R.C. §§ 1271-1275.
4 See Wilkerson v. Comm’r, 655 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1981),
rev'g, 70 T.C. 240 (1978); Battlestein v. Internal Revenue
Service, 631 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 9381 (1981); Menz v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 1174 (1983).
5 See Davison v. Comm’r, 107 T.C. 35 (1996), aff'd, 141
F.3d 403 (2d Cir. 1998) (cash basis borrower not entitled
to interest deduction where funds used to satisfy interest
obligation were borrowed for that purpose from same
l nder); Stone v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-507 (interest
payments in form of promissory notes; interest not
considered paid).
6 See I.R.C. § 1272(a)(1), (a)(2)(C), 1273(a)(1).
7 I.R.C. § 1273(a)(1)(B).
8 I.R.C. § 1273(a)(1)(A).
9 I.R.C. § 1273(a)(1).
10 Tre s. Reg. § 1.1275-2(a).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
PERMISSIVE USE .  The original owner of the disputed
land , just over seven acres, had acquired the land by patent
from the United States and the land bordered federal land.
To separate the owner’s land from the federal land, the
owner erected a fence of barbed wire along the boundary.
The barbed wire was loosely strung between existing trees
and some added posts and the owner did not intend that the
fence was the trust boundary between the properties. The
neighboring federal land was later transferred to private
ownership and the fence remained, although all owners
recognized that the fence was not the true boundary. The
fence also meandered in various curves and angles along
the boundary, which was represented as a straight line on
transfer documents. The plaintiff and defendant became the
eventual owners of the land on each side of the fence. One
of the plaintiff’s children built a residence on one acre of
the disputed land more than ten years prior to the present
suit. The court held that the fence was a fence of
convenience and the plaintiff’s use of the disputed land was
permissive, because (1) the fence was never intended to
mark the true boundary, (2) the fence was erected only to
separate the properties, and (3) the fence was not
constructed in a method to indicate that it was intended to
be the boundary. As to the last holding, the court noted that
most governmental patents divided land with straight lines
and the fence meandered from tree to tree. The court
allowed the daughter’s one acre to pass to the daughter by
adverse possession because the building of a house on the
property was an open and hostile declaration of ownership
which went beyond the implied permissive use that arose
from th  fence of convenience. Kimball v. Turner, 993
P.2d 303 (Wyo. 1999).
ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff was injured when bitten by a
horse in a stable owned by the defendant. The plaintiff was
invited to the stables to watch a friend take a horse riding
lesson. After the lesson, the plaintiff was walking through
the stable when one of the stalled horses bit the plaintiff on
the arm. The defendant raised the defense that the Michigan
Equine Activity Liability Act, Mich. Stat. § 691.1661 et
seq., barred suit for any damages. The statute provided that
participants in an equine activity could not sue for damages
arising out of the equine activity. The plaintiff argued that
the plaintiff did not participate in any equine activity when
the bite occurred. The court held that the plaintiff’s
presence at the stables to watch the riding lesson was a
participation in an equine activity and included walking in
the stables past horse stalls; therefore, the plaintiff was
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barred from suing for damages against the stable owner.
The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant knew that the
horse was dangerous and the plaintiff sought strict liability
for the injuries. The court held that the statute barred suit
for strict liability actions as well as in negligence. The
plaintiff also argued that the statute required a warning sign
on all doors of buildings where horses were kept. The
defendant’s stable only had one sign at the main entrance.
The court held that the sign was sufficient to meet the
statutory requirement. Amburgey v. Sauder, 605 N.W.2d
84 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
BANKRUPTCY
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . The debtor failed to file tax returns for
1983 through 1989 and the IRS issued deficiency notices
for taxes for those years based on W-2 forms supplied by
the debtor’s employer. The debtor appealed the deficiency
to the Tax Court and eventually entered into a stipulation
with the IRS as to the tax liability for those years. The IRS
then assessed the taxes and, within a month of the
assessment, the debtor filed income tax returns which
contained only the amount of wages and the stipulated
amount of taxes due. The IRS argued that the returns were
insufficient for Section 523(a)(1)(B) because the returns
were filed after the taxes were assessed. The Bankruptcy
Court held that the returns were effective under Section 523
because the returns were in compliance with the
stipulations in the Tax Court case and Section 523(a)(1)(B)
had no requirement that the returns be filed before any
assessment. After the Bankruptcy Court ruling, the Sixth
Circuit decided In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d 1029 (6th Cir.
1999), which held that a taxpayer’s post-assessment-filed
tax return was not sufficient under Section 523(1)(1)(B) if
the return did not serve any purpose in assessing the taxes.
The District Court reversed, holding that, if the debtor’s
return did not serve any tax-related purpose, the return was
not sufficient under Section 523(a)(1)(B) to make the taxes
dischargeable. On remand, the Bankruptcy Court held that
the debtor’s return did not serve any tax-related purpose;
therefore, the taxes were nondischargeable because the
debtor had not filed a tax return as to those taxes. In re
Pierchoski, 243 B.R. 639 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1999), on
rem. From, 243 B.R. 267 (W.D. Pa. 1999), rev’g and
rem’g, 220 B.R. 20 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1998).
After losing a Tax Court case which held that the debtor
owed taxes, the debtor married his long-time companion
and executed an antenuptial agreement which transferred all
of the assets of a corporation owned by the debtor to the
debtor’s spouse’s corporation. In return, the spouse
transferred to the debtor debts owed to her by the debtor.
Neither set of assets had much value because the debtor’s
corporation had been incurring substantial losses. However,
because the debtor’s corporation owned the debtor’s
residence and vehicles, the antenuptial agreement
effectively removed from the debtor’s estate all assets
against which the IRS could levy to satisfy the Tax Court
judgment. The IRS petitioned for nondischarge of the
debtor on the tax claims for willful and fraudulent attempt
to evade taxes. The court held that the tax debt was
nondischargeable because the intentional and voluntary
tra sfer of the debtor’s assets without adequate
consid ration to a family member was a willful and
fraudulent attempt to evade taxes. In re Griffith, 2000-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,317 (11th Cir. 2000), aff’g,
210 B.R. 216 (S.D. Fla. 1997), aff’g, 161 B.R. 727
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
CONTRACTS
HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS. The plaintiff
was a cooperative which entered into several hedge-to-
arrive contracts with the defendant. As in all of these cases,
the increasing price for corn in 1995-96 reduced the
profitability of these contracts to the cooperative and the
producer. The defendant in this case had also agreed to pay
the margin costs of the contracts. When the cooperative
became concerned about the increased costs and public
statements from the Iowa Attorney General that the
contracts may be illegal, the cooperative requested
assurance of performance from the defendant in the form of
either (1) payment of the margins and commissions due or
(2) a signed letter that the defendant would deliver the grain
as intended.. The jury determined that the request for
assurance was reasonable. The court upheld the jury verdict
in that the high margin costs, large costs of the rollovers
and the statements of the Attorney General were sufficient
to raise a jury issue of the reasonableness of the request for
assurance of delivery. The defendant argued that the
contract was an illegal futures contract. The court held that
the contracts were not illegal under the Commodity
Exchange Act because delivery was always intended. Top




FEED. The GIPSA has adopted as final regulations
requiring a scale ticket for livestock and poultry feed where
the feed is weighed by or on behalf of a stockyard owner,
market agency, dealer, packer, or live poultry dealer and
where the weight of feed is a factor in determining payment
or settlement to a livestock grower or poultry grower. 65
Fed. Reg. 17758 (April 5, 2000).
PEANUTS. The FSA has adopted as final a national
pean t poundage quota for 2000 of 1,180,000 short tons. 65
F d. Reg. 16117 (March 27, 2000).
WETLANDS . The defendant leased farmland from the
defendant’s father. A portion of the land had been unusable
because of trees and the defendant cut down the trees and
pulled up the stumps in preparation for making the land
usable. After the swampbuster provisions were enacted, the
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land was determined to be wetland covered by the act and
the defendant was told not to finish the work on the land
where the trees were located. Some of the work was hired
out and paid for by the parent. The SCS determined that
conversion work continued and the defendant was ruled to
be ineligible for farm program payments. The defendant
argued that the parent as landowner had control over the
conversion process and that the defendant should not be
made ineligible because of the actions of the landowner.
The court held that the defendant, as operator of the farm,
had sufficient control to make the defendant responsible for
the wetlands conversion. United States v. Dierckman, 201




CHARITABLE DEDUCTION . The IRS has discovered
an abuse of the charitable lead trust provisions. There is no
statutory limitation on the permissible term for a guaranteed
annuity interest or a unitrust interest in order for the trust to
qualify for the charitable deduction. The IRS has found that
taxpayers attempt to take advantage of the regulations by
using an unrelated individual's measuring life, as the term
of a charitable lead trust, to artificially inflate the charitable
deduction. Taxpayers select as a measuring life an
individual who is seriously ill but not “terminally ill” within
the meaning of the I.R.C. § 7520 regulations. Because the
individual is not “terminally ill” as defined in the
regulations, the charitable interest is valued based on the
actuarial tables. These tables take into account the life
expectancies of all individuals of the same age as the
individual who is the measuring life, even though such
individual has been carefully chosen because he or she
likely will not live to an average life expectancy. When the
seriously ill individual dies prior to the life expectancy, the
amount the charity actually receives will be significantly
less than the amount on which the gift or estate tax
charitable deduction was based. Conversely, the amount of
the actual transfer to the remainder beneficiaries will be
significantly greater than the amount subject to gift or estate
tax.
The IRS has issued proposed regulations under which the
permissible term for guaranteed annuity interests and
unitrust interests is either a specified term of years, or the
life of certain individuals living at the date of the transfer.
Only one or more of the following individuals may be used
as measuring lives: the donor, the donor's spouse, and a
lineal ancestor of all the remainder beneficiaries. However,
this limitation regarding permissible measuring lives does
not apply in the case of a charitable guaranteed annuity
interest or unitrust interest payable under a charitable
remainder trust described in I.R.C. § 664. An interest
payable for a specified term of years can qualify as a
guaranteed annuity or unitrust interest even if the governing
instrument contains a “savings clause” intended to ensure
compliance with a rule against perpetuities. The savings
clause must utilize a period for vesting of 21 years after the
de ths of measuring lives who are selected to maximize,
rather than limit, the term of the trust. For example, a
guaranteed annuity or unitrust interest that will terminate on
the earlier of 30 years or 21 years after the death of the last
urvivor f the descendants of any grandparent of the donor
livi g on the date of the creation of the interest will be
treated as payable for a specified term of years. 65 F d.
Reg. 17835 (April 5, 2000).
INCOME IN RESPECT OF DECEDENT . The
taxpayer owned stock options. The option term was for a
period of not more than 15 years from the grant date,
subject to the termination provisions of the plan. Upon the
taxpayer's retirement, the option agreement provided that
any vested options would be exercisable for the balance of
the initial exercise period. If the taxpayer died prior to the
end of the option exercise period, the taxpayer's
unexercised options could be exercised by the beneficiary
during the remaining period. The taxpayer named a
charitable organization, qualified under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3),
as the designated beneficiary of a portion of the
nonqualified vested options. The IRS ruled that the bequest
of the nqualified employer stock options to a charitable
org ization would result in income in respect of decedent
under I.R.C. § 691  to the charitable organization at the
time the options are exercised by such charitable
orga ization, and not to the taxpayer's estate if still open at
the time of the exercise, and not to the heirs or devisees of
t e taxpayer if the taxpayer's estate is closed at the time the
options are exercised. Ltr. Rul. 200012076, Dec. 23, 1999.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT . The decedent was the
income beneficiary of a pre-1942 trust established by the
will of a deceased parent. The decedent also acted as
executor of the parent’s estate which was never closed. The
trust provided that discretionary distributions of income be
made to the parent’s surviving spouse sufficient to pay
basic living expenses. The decedent thus has the power to
distribute trust income either to the income beneficiaries,
including the decedent, or to the surviving spouse. The IRS
ruled that the decedent did not have a general power of
appointment over the trust because the decedent acted as a
fiduciary and had no power to distribute trust principal and
no power to distribute trust income except as granted by the
trust instrument. Ltr Rul. 200013012, Dec. 21, 1999.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBTS. The taxpayers, husband and wife, were
each one-third shareholders of a small corporation. The
husband’s father also owned a one-third share. The
corpora ion’s business failed when creditors seized the
corporation’s assets. The taxpayers claimed a business bad
debt deduction for amounts loaned to the corporation. The
court noted that the loans were evidenced by promissory
notes with due dates for repayment; however, the court held
hat the loans were capital contributions not eligible for the
bad debt deduction because (1) the corporation did not have
su ficient funds to repay the loans; (2) the corporation made
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no payments and the taxpayers made no effort to enforce
the notes; (3) the taxpayers controlled the corporation; (4)
the promissory notes were not issued contemporaneously
with the loans and did not match the loan amounts; (5) the
loan amounts were approximately in proportion to the
taxpayers’ interest in the corporation; (6) the corporation
was thinly capitalized; and (7) the loans were risky but
provided for no collateral. Jensen v. Comm’r, 2000-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,311 (10th Cir. 2000).
C CORPORATIONS-ALM  § 7.02.*
ACCOUNTING METHOD. The taxpayer corporation
operated a sand and gravel supply and transportation
business. The taxpayer purchased the sand and gravel from
suppliers and transported the material to the purchaser’s
building sites. The taxpayer charged a mark up for the sand
and gravel and charged for the transportation. For some
customers, the taxpayer only provided the transportation of
materials acquired by the customer. The court held that the
sand and gravel (1) were merchandise, under Treas. Reg. §
1.171-1; (2) were, when purchased by the taxpayer for the
customer, owned by the taxpayer prior to sale to customers;
and (3) were an income producing factor in the taxpayer’s
business. Therefore, the court held that the taxpayer was
required to use the accrual accounting method. The court
distinguished the case from RACMP Enterprises, Inc.,
below, where the materials were an indispensable and
inseparable part of the taxpayer’s services. Von Euw &
L.J. Nunes Trucking, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-
114.
The taxpayer was a corporation which constructed
concrete foundations, driveways and sidewalks for
customers. The taxpayer ordered the concrete and other
building materials for the construction projects which were
delivered directly to the construction site. The court held
that the concrete and other building materials were not
merchandise sold by the taxpayer, under Treas. Reg. §
1.171-1, because the materials were indispensable and
inseparable part of the services provided by the taxpayer in
constructing the foundations, driveways and sidewalks. The
court also noted that the materials were not possessed by
the taxpayer but were delivered by third parties directly to
the construction sites and the materials were not a major
income producing factor since the taxpayer’s services were
essential to produce any value from the materials. RACMP
Enterprises, Inc. v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. No. 16 (2000).
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14]. The taxpayer’s employment was terminated and
the taxpayer believed the termination was solely because
the taxpayer knew too much about the employer’s
environmental violations. The taxpayer’s lawyer negotiated
a termination settlement which exceeded the normal
termination payment by $280,000. The taxpayer excluded
the entire settlement from gross income, arguing that the
settlement was a payment for personal injuries. The District
Court held that, although no suit was filed or the taxpayer
made any personal injury claim to the employer, the
settlement was paid, in part, to compensate the taxpayer for
wrongful employment termination. The court allocated the
settlement to the personal injury only to the extent the
settlement exceeded the normal termination payment,
$280,000. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s
holding that some of the payment above the normal
ermination amount was excludible from income as
compensation for personal injuries. However, the appellate
cou t remanded the case for a determination of the portion
of the $280,000 which was compensation for the personal
injuries. Greer v. United States, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,300 (6th Cir. 2000), aff’g in part, 98-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,821 (E.D. Ky. 1998).
The taxpayer filed a suit against an employer for age
discrimination, alleging violations of the federal and state
age discrimination laws. The petition asked for damages for
fringe benefits, front and back pay, and pain and suffering.
The employer decided to settle the suit and pay the taxpayer
for the front and back pay damages. The taxpayer accepted
the settlement but required that the settlement agreement
allocate all of the payment to pain and suffering. The court
looked beyond the language of the settlement and found
that the settlement amount was intended by the employer to
compensate the taxpayer only for front and back pay. The
court held that the entire settlement was income to the
taxpayer because the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that
any of the settlement proceeds was intended to compensate
the taxpayer for personal injuries. Peaco v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 2000-122.
The taxpayer’s employment was terminated and the
employer offered the taxpayer severance pay if the taxpayer
would sign a release of all claims against the company. The
taxpayer had not made any claims or filed any suits against
the employer before signing the release. The employer paid
the severance pay based on the number of the taxpayer’s
years of employment and the employer retained various
withholding taxes from the payment. The release made no
mention of any payments for personal injuries to the
taxpayer. The court held that the payment was severance
pay and not a payment for personal injuries; therefore, the
payment was included in the taxpayer’s gross income.
Laguaite v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-103.
DEDUCTIONS. The taxpayer was a corporation which
owned an airplane which was used by its employees for
nonbusiness purposes. The employees reported the value of
th  use of the airplane in their gross income and the
taxpayer claimed the cost of the airplane as a deduction.
The IRS argued that I.R.C. § 274(e)(2) limited the
deductions to the amount included in the income of the
employees. The court held that I.R.C. § 274(e)(2) allowed
the full deductions so long as the employees report as
income the value of the use of the airplane but did not limit
the deduction to the amount reported as income.
Sutherland Lumber-Southwest, Inc. v. Comm’r, 114
T.C. No. 14 (2000).
DEPRECIATION. The taxpayer constructed a waste
processing facility which included a building and the
processing machinery. The facility was designed and
constructed under a contract with the federal government
exclusively for the processing of a certain kind of waste
material and the facility could not be economically
converted to process any other kind of waste. The
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construction of the facility required that the building and
machinery be constructed together such that if the
machinery had to be replaced, the building would also have
to be replaced. The IRS ruled that the facility was not a
building under Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e). The IRS also held
that the facility, exclusive of the equipment contained
therein, was included in asset class 49.5 of Rev. Proc. 87-56
and, as a result, was classified as 7-year property under
§168(e). Ltr. Rul. 200013038, Dec. 27, 1999.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . On March 17, 2000, the
president determined that certain areas in Alabama are
eligible for assistance under the Act as a result of severe
storms and flooding on March 10-11, 2000 (FEMA-1322-
DR). Taxpayers in these areas who sustained losses
attributable to the disaster may deduct them on their 1999
returns.
EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTION PLANS . The taxpayer
owned stock in an ESOP and sold the stock back to the
corporation. The taxpayer used the proceeds to purchase
qualified replacement property and elected to defer the gain
from the sale, with the gain applied to reduce the basis of
the property. The taxpayer then contributed the replacement
property to a partnership in exchange for a partnership
interest. The IRS ruled that the contribution of the
replacement property was a disposition, causing recognition
of the deferred gain. Rev. Rul. 2000-18, I.R.B. 2000-__.
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD. The taxpayer was married
and had three children. Although the taxpayer lived with
the spouse, the couple were estranged emotionally. The
couple agreed to remain living together in order to retain a
home for their children. The taxpayer was the sole
proprietor of a small trucking company and worked
primarily from the residence. The taxpayer filed income tax
returns using the head of household tax rate and claimed
two of the children as dependents. The court held that the
taxpayer was not entitled to head of household status
because the taxpayer’s spouse also lived in the same
residence. The court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that,
because the couple was estranged, they lived in separate
households. The taxpayer was assessed an accuracy penalty
because the taxpayer presented no evidence that the
taxpayer made any attempt to determine the proper filing
status. Chiosie v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-117.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayers, husband and wife,
owned and operated an Arabian horse breeding farm. The
court held that the taxpayers engaged in the activity for
profit because (1) the taxpayers operated the activity in a
business-like manner by maintaining complete and accurate
books, records on each horse, and a business plan; (2) the
taxpayer spent a significant amount of time in the activity;
(3) the taxpayers demonstrated, through expert appraisal
testimony, that the real and personal property would
appreciate in value; (4) the taxpayers had successfully
started and operated several other businesses; (5) the losses
occurred during the reasonable startup period; (6) the tax
losses generated by the activity came primarily from actual
expenditures made by the taxpayers from their own funds;
and (7) although the taxpayers enjoyed riding and working
with horses, most of the horse showing activities had a
subst tial and legitimate business purpose. Davis v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-101.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, owned and operated a
racking horse farm where they resided. The court ruled that
they did not operate the farm with the intent to make a
profit because (1) although the taxpayer maintained
complete and accurate records, the court found that the
taxpayers did not have a business plan to make the
operation profitable; (2) although the taxpayers gained
much knowledge about breeding horses, the taxpayers
failed to have or acquire knowledge about how to make a
breeding activity profitable; (3) the taxpayers failed to
provide evidence that any of the real or personal property
would appreciate in value; (4) the taxpayers did not have
any experience at successfully starting and operating a
business similar to the horse breeding business; (5) the
operation had several years of losses and no profitable
years; (6) although some aspects of the operation did
produc  some revenue, that revenue was disproportionate to
the large losses incurred; and (7) the taxpayers had income
from other employment which was offset by the losses from
the farm. Berry v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-109.
MARKET SEGMENT TRAINING GUIDE . The IRS
has announced the publication of a revised Reforestation
Industry Market Segment Specialization Program Training
Guide.
The IRS has announced the publication of a revised
Tobacco Industry Market Segment Specialization Program
Training Guide.
The IRS has announced the publication of a revised
Veterinary Medicine Market Segment Specialization
Program Training Guide.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM  § 7.03.*
CONSISTENCY. The taxpayers joined with two other
persons to purchase a fruit and vegetable farm in another
state. The owners then formed a partnership which treated
the f rm as partnership property, although title to the farm
was not actually transferred to the partnership. The
partnership claimed expenses and other deductions from the
farm on the partnership tax return and the taxpayers
claimed their one-third share of partnership losses on their
individual returns. The farm did not do well financially and
the farm was sold. Just prior to the sale, the taxpayers
transferred the partnership interest to a professional
corporation owned by the taxpayers. However, no transfer
agreement or other written document was executed. The
sale of the farm produced significant gain which was
reported on the partnership final return but the taxpayers
did not include their share of the gain on their return. The
taxpayers argued they had no gain from the sale of the farm
because (1) the farm was not partnership property, since
title was never transferred to the partnership and (2) the
partnership interest belonged to the corporation on the date
of the ale. The court held that the duty of consistency, as
es ablished by Beltzer v. United States, 495 F.2d 211 (8th
Cir. 1974), prohibited the taxpayers from treating the farm
as partnership property over several years of tax returns and
changi  their position in the final tax return, especially
when the statute of limitations on assessments had expired
for some or all of the earlier tax years. The court also
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rejected the taxpayers’ claim that the partnership interest
was owned by the corporation, because the taxpayers failed
to provide any documentary evidence of the transfer.
Hollen v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-99.
PASSIVE LOSSES. The taxpayer owned seven
residential rental properties. The taxpayer spent more than
600 hours per year in managing the properties but less than
500 hours per year on any one property. On the taxpayer’s
returns, the taxpayer did not make a clear election, as a real
estate professional, to treat the seven properties as one
activity, which would have qualified the properties for
deduction of net losses, even though the rental activity was
otherwise subject to the passive loss limitations. Instead,
the taxpayer merely claimed a deduction for the net losses
and aggregated the income and losses of all the properties.
The taxpayer’s returns were filed prior to the effective date
of regulations providing rules for making the real estate
professional election to treat the seven properties as one
activity. The court held that the statute, I.R.C. § 469(c)(7),
required a clear election and that the mere reporting of the
losses as if the election was made was insufficient to make
a qualified election. Therefore, the court held that the
taxpayer had to treat each property as a separate activity,
requiring that any losses be carried over which were not
offset by passive income. Kosonen v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 2000-107.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in March 2000,
the weighted average is 6.01 percent with the permissible
range of 5.44 to 6.34 percent (90 to 106 percent permissible
range) and 5.44 to 6.64 percent (90 to 110 percent
permissible range) for purposes of determining the full
funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 2000-
18, I.R.B. 2000-__.
RETURNS. For 1996 and 1997, the taxpayer claimed an
exemption for a minor son but failed to provide a social
security or taxpayer identification number for the son as
required by I.R.C. § 151.  Instead, the taxpayer filed an
affidavit pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 301.6109-1(c) and
claimed that the regulation provided an exception to the
statute. The court held that the statute took precedence over
the regulation and created an absolute requirement that no
exemption was allowed if the return did not report a SSN or
TIN for the dependent claimed as an exemption. The
holding was affirmed in a decision designated as not for
publication. Furlow v. United States, 2000-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,324 (4th Cir. 2000), aff’g 99-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,684 (D. Md. 1999).,
The IRS has announced the publication of Form 8308
(Rev. March 2000), Report of a Sale or Exchange of
Certain Partnership Interests. This form is available (1) by
calling the IRS's toll-free telephone number, 1-800-829-
3676; (2) at http://www.irs.gov/prod; (3) through FedWorld
on the Internet; or (4) by directly accessing the IRS bulletin
board at (703) 321-8020.
The IRS has announced that it will not impose penalties
under I.R.C. §§ 6721, 6722 on certain taxpayers for failure
to file information returns or furnish payee statements
under I.R.C. § 6050P for discharges of indebtedness
occurring before January 1, 2001. This rule applies only to
taxpayer  who were made subject to I.R.C. § 6050P by
S ction 533(a) of the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives
Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, 113 Stat.
1860 (1999). Section 533(a) of the Act amended I.R.C. §
6050P by expanding the types of entities that are required
to report discharges of indebtedness to include any
organization “a significant trade or business of which is the
lending of money.” Notice 2000-22, I.R.B. 2000-__.
SALE OR LEASE. The taxpayer was approached by
another person for financing of a restaurant. The other
p rson owned a liquor license. The taxpayer agreed to
construct the restaurant and lease it to the person. The
taxpayer formed a corporation to purchase the land and
construct the restaurant. The lessee transferred the liquor
license to the corporation for minimal consideration. The
lease terms included rent over 15 years which corresponded
to amortization of the construction costs at a 15 percent
interest rate. The lease provided the lessee with the option
to purchase the property after 10 years at 125 percent of the
remaining lease payments. The lessee was responsible for
all exp nses and taxes from the property. During
construction of the restaurant, the lease payments were
adjusted to reflect additional construction costs. The
corporation treated the transaction as a lease on its income
tax returns but the lessee treated the payments as loan
payments. The court held that the transaction was a sale and
financing arrangement requiring the taxpayer to recognize
gain from the transaction because (1) the conveyance of the
liquor license for minimal consideration indicated that the
license was transferred as collateral for the transaction, (2)
the lessee had all the risks and benefits of ownership of the
property and the taxpayer had a fixed return; (3) the
payments included an interest component and were
dependent upon the total cost of the construction; (4) the
option to purchase gave the lessee all the benefits of any
appreciation of the property; and (5) the lessee had been
seeking a financing source for the restaurant. Guaderrama
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-104.
STATE TAXES . The taxpayers received royalty income
from properties located in several states. Each state
imposed a nonresident income tax on the royalty payments
and the taxpayers claimed the taxes as a state income tax
deduction. The court held that the state tax deduction was
allowed only to the extent the tax applied to business or
trade property; therefore, the deduction for an income tax
on royalties was not eligible for the state tax deduction.
Strange v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. No. 15 (2000).
CITATION UPDATES
Estate of O’Neal v. United States, 81 F. Supp.2d 1205
(N.D. Ala. 1999) (claims against the estate) see p. 4, supra
Jordan v. Case Corp., 993 P.2d 650 (Kan. Ct. App.
1999) (product liability, combine) see p. 38 supra.
United States v. Farley, 202 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000),
aff’g, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,370 (W.D. Pa.
1999) (discharge of indebtedness) see p. 31, su ra.
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The Agricultural Law Press announces two new annual seminars
SEMINAR IN THE OZARKS
&
SEMINAR IN NEW MEXICO
  AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
May 31, June 1-3, 2000 Tan-Tar-A Resort, Lake of the Ozarks
August 16-19, 2000 Inn of the Mountain Gods, Mescalero, NM
Come join us for a world-class seminar on the hottest topics in agricultural tax and law. Space is limited for these wonderful
opportunities to gain expert insight into agricultural law and enjoy the many activities offered by both of these splendid resorts.
The first seminar will be Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday, May 31, June 1-3, 2000 at the Tan-Tar-A Resort & Spa
located on the Lake of the Ozarks located in the heart of the Missouri Ozarks. The second seminar will be Wednesday, Thursday,
Friday and Saturday, August 16-19, 2000 at the Inn of the Mountain Gods resort in the south central mountains of New Mexico.
Registrants may attend one, two, three or all four days, with separate pricing for each combination. On Wednesday, Dr. Harl will
speak about farm and ranch income tax. On Thursday, Dr. Harl will cover farm and ranch estate tax. On Friday, Roger McEowen
will cover farm and ranch business planning. On Saturday, Roger McEowen will cover current developments in several other areas
of agricultural law. Your registration fee includes a copy of Dr. Neil Harl's seminar manuals, Farm Income Tax (almost 300 pages)
and Farm Estate and Business Planning: Annotated Materials  (nea ly 500 pages) and a copy of Roger McEowen’s outline, all of
which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small additional
charge. Continental buffet breakfasts and break refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income averaging; earned
income credit; commodity futures transactions; paying wages in kind.
• Federal estate tax, including 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax, co-ownership discounts, alternate valuation date,
special use valuation, family-owned business deduction (FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction planning, disclaimers,
planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities, self-
canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability companies.
• Legal developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and environmental law.
Special room discounts are available at both resorts. The resorts feature a variety of splendid guest accommodations and activities,
including horseback riding, golf, sailing, hiking, tennis, fishing, and swimming.
The seminar registration fees  for current subscribers    to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles of
Agricultural Law are $175 (one day), $340 (two days), $490 (three days), and $620 (four days).  The registration fees for
nonsubscribers    are $195, $380, $550 and $700 respectively. The registration fees are higher for registrations within 30 days prior to
the seminar. A registration form is available online at www.agrilawpress.com
For more information, call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail at robert@agr awpress.com
